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Article 6

Book Reviews

Social Chaucer by Paul Strohm. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1989. Pp. xiii + 236. $29.95.
Recent criticism of medieval literature has shown encouraging signs of
movement away from the impasse marked (as Lee Patterson has recently
argued) by debates between supporters of the anti-humanist project of Robertsonian exegetical criticism, on the one hand, and those who favor the liberal humanism implicit in New Critical explication in the style of Donaldson
and Muscatine, on the other. The versions of Chaucer produced by these different approaches tended to mirror the values and concerns of the critic: a
politically conservative, orthodox Christian poet according to the first
method; a non-authoritarian, bemused observer of the human comedy according to the second. Paul Strohm's important new book is best understood
in the light of recent attempts to open up Chaucer studies to the various historicist currents-Marxist, feminist, New Historicist, and so on-that are
gaining momentum in the profession.
Strohm argues that rapid changes taking place in fourteenth-century England rendered increasingly obsolete the commonplace descriptions of medieval society (such as the theory of three estates) that were left over from an
earlier period. Strohm's thesis is that "Chaucer's own poetry embraces a
lively contention between vertical and horizontal forms of social depiction"
(x). He contrasts the conservative view of society as a descending "hierarchy
... of vertically arrayed estates" with an alternative view in the Middle Ages
of society "as horizontally arrayed, communal, secular, and bound in finite
time" (x). Strohm generally associates the vertical paradigm with feudalism,
which was based on lifelong loyalties and ties of vassalage; he associates the
horizontal paradigm with what he frequently calls "postfeudalism," a world
based more on self-interest, contractual relations, and cash remuneration.
Strohm borrows this story of a "vertical" social structure that gradually
gave way to a "horizontal" one from a discussion by M. D. Chenu of the
"desacralization" of the political order that was taking place simultaneously
with the proliferation of new social formations (the passage quoted by
Strohm on p. 13 is incorrectly cited; for p. 65, read p. 265). While acknowledging that Chenu is discussing twelfth- and thirteenth-century France,
Strohm thinks that signs of a transition from a vertically ordered society to a
horizontally organized one, where social ties were often temporary arrangements based more on expediency than on traditional loyalties, are first apparent in England during the fourteenth century. We shall return to this historical thesis later.
The book is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1, "Chaucer and the Structure of Social Relations," argues that the most detailed descriptions of the
middle ranks of society during the later Middle Ages took place within the
tradition that stressed horizontal ties. Chaucer himself occupied an ambiguous social position: though the son of a wine merchant, he had reached gentle status. After discussing the increasing appearance of "retaining by indenture," a contractual system that "sought . .. to perpetuate older values (such
as continuity of service to a single lord)" (17), Strohm concludes that Chaucer's ties to his monarchs were characterized "by the complex mixture of residualloyalty and unabashed self-interest that united lords and their followers within the bastard feudalism of the late fourteenth century" (23).
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Chapter 2, "The King's Affinity," sheds valuable light on the retinue groups
forming Chaucer's immediate social milieu. Strohm manages to condense
within a few pages the complexities of factional politics while stressing Chaucer's remarkable ability to survive the dangers which cost many of his associates their lives. His synthesis is useful, particularly for the discussion of the
individuals who are generally thought to fonn the poet's immediate "circle."
The question of Chaucer's circle naturally leads to Chapter 3, "Audience,"
which extends Strohm's previous work on that topic. He promotes a model
of literature as "communication," Here his main influence is the reception
theory of Jauss, supplemented with the sociolinguistics of Voloshinov /Bakhtin. Strohm thus reads the Book of the Duchess as an instance of "social
communication" (is there another kind?). There follows a discussion of the
audience of Trailus and Criseyde. As Strohm rightly observes, the "poem presupposes an audience capable of embracing a mixture of styles and tones of
voice and of managing abrupt transitions between them" (63). Chaucer could
count on just such an audience during the years of his residence in Aldgate"the period of greatest stability in Chaucer's life," the time when "he would
have come closer than ever again in his career to participation in a stahle social and literary circle" (63). In the Canterbury Tales, on the other hand,
Chaucer creates the pilgrims as "a fictional audience" to supplement "the absence of a stable communicative situation" once he had moved from London
to Kent (64-65). This possibility, while certainly intriguing, is hardly susceptible of proof. Strohm suggests that the "highly contrastive poetic features"
characteristic of his poetry" are likely to appeal to those in ambiguous social
situations" (71). This is a weak argument, and his attempt to bolster it somewhat by turning to Chaucer's short poems is not altogether convincing. The
chapter closes with a valuable discussion of the work of Usk, Scogan, and
Clanvow€, whose poetry suggests that they valued Chaucer's mixed genres,
multiple voicings, and open poetic forms.
Chapter 4, "Selflessness and Selfishness," offers a discussion of the conflict
between those motives in the Canterbury Tales. The section entitled "The Debased Language of Sworn Relations" provides interesting observations on
metaphors of vassalage, though one might hesitate to see the many examples
of false oath-swearing and the breakdown of trouthe as evidence of a historical shift whereby "sworn vassalage n [is] replaced by a variety of looser and
more frankly self-interested affiliations" (93). When were lords and vassals
not motivated by self-interest? Vassals were no truer to their word in the
good old days of feudalism than in the fourteenth century. The section on
"Opportunistic Brotherhood: however, is especially illuminating. A critique
of misguided voluntary associations, as Strohm demonstrates, is of central
concern not only to the Pardoner's Tale but also to the Friar's Tale and Summoner's Tale, all of which "suggest that the driving force behind the debasement of sworn relationships is the allure of singular or personal profit" (100);
Chaucer appears very much the conservative moralist here. The Shipman's
Tale emerges as Chaucer's most biting critique of lithe extension of the mercantile ethos to all spheles of activity" (100). The breakdown of trouthe provides the focus of a valuable discussion of the "post-feudal society" figured in
Trailus and Criseyde and the Franklin's Tale.
Chapter 5, "Time and the Social Implications of Narrative Form," is per-
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haps the least convincing, for Strohm attempts to make some rather oldfashioned formalist criticism fit the bill of describing a "social" Chaucer, as
the following sentence suggests: "Even in its most apparently aesthetic aspects, narrative cannot help being social, in the way its continuities and discontinuities speak to the purpose and meaning of human action in time"
(112). By the same token, even the most apparently New Critical reading
cannot help being social-but that observation is hardly illuminating. For a
demonstration that Chaucer "asserts a social basis for ideas about time and
narrative" (125), Strohm turns, predictably, to the contrast between the
Knight's Tale and the Miller's Tale, narratives which "introduce and interrogate two differing constructions of reality: one hierarchical ... vertical ...
and extratemporal in its aspirations; the other antihierarchical ... horizontal
.. and temporal ..." (139). Strohm suggests that Chaucer, whose gentle status was not based on hereditary land tenure, belonged to "the social grouping most extensively traversed by these conflicting versions of social reality"
(142). Perhaps so; but even kings, who were great believers in "vertical hierarchy," regularly formed horizontal, this-wordly associations through marriage alliances with their European counterparts. The vertical/horizontal
schema fails to convince if it must be selectively applied.
The final chapter, "A Mixed Commonwealth of Style," begins with the
fruitful insight that the Canterbury fellowship is created through a "social
contract." This produces a reading far more interesting than the "roadside
drama" interpretation of yore. After a brief discussion of medieval political
theories of the "natural state" that proliferated with the recovery of Aristotle's
Politics, Strohm develops the analogy between the natural state and the imaginary "commonwealth" of gentils and cherls under Harry Bailly's government. Strohm writes suggestively of Chaucer's "capacity .to reveal the selfmaintaining processes by which a social body may act in time to accommodate new social groups, reconcile disputes, and chastise antisocial impulses"
(152). He recognizes that Chaucer's "limited assertion of coherentia" is a
"considerable distortion of factional and schismatic actuality" that forms "an
ideologically constructed bridge between Chaucer and his predominantly
gentil public" (157). He suggests that Chaucer's distortion is "self-interested"
since his own social position depends upon the willingness of his superiors to
receive "previously excluded" groups into their gentle ranks. Though Strohm
admits that Chaucer's "solution" to the problem of social division is ideological, he finds it appealing nonetheless because it is "socially energetic"whatever that means: his favorite trope seems to involve electricity
("ideologically charged" appears scattered at least a dozen times throughout
the book). Strohm concludes the chapter with sections on "Hierarchy and
Community," "A Literary Model of Social Diversity" and "The Silent Plowman and the Talkative Parson." These offer some of his most interesting discussions.
What, then, is the "social" Chaucer? As my summary makes clear, Strohm
excludes any detailed consideration of kinship and marriage, the social production of gender, sexuality, the growth of English national identity during
the Hundred Years' War, to name only a few important matters no less social
than factional politics, class relations, or ideas of the state. Medieval spirituality was also a complex social phenomenon, as recent work by social histori-
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ans such as Caroline Bynum demonstrates. Owing to these significant OInissions, the author's idea of a "social" Chaucer seems less inclusive than the title might suggest.
A few words, however, need to be devoted to Strohm's historical thesis,
which seems to waver between viewing the shift from a vertical to a horizontal paradigm as equivalent to the replacement of feudalism by capitalism, on
the one hand, and as an "altemative tendency" (3) available throughout the
Middle Ages (albeit much more prominently by the fourteenth century), on
the other. Chenu saw the process of "desaeralization" as a chronological development first evident during the High Middle Ages; Strohm, however, is
less certain (see 173 for example). In any case, it is a mistake to call the horizontal paradigm "nonhierarchical or even antihierarchical" (3), for Strohm
downplays the hierarchy implicit in the corporate metaphor of the body politic, over which the head must rule; there is nothing inherently antihierarchical about this theory (d. the garden scene in Richard II).
If Strohm sometimes views horizontal social formations and ideologies as
fast replacing hierarchical ones by the fourteenth century, we would be hard
pressed to specify when the "previous era" of "the saered bonds of vassalage"
existed (101). As Susan Reynolds has argued in Kingdoms and Communities in
Western Europe, 900-1300 (Oxford 1984)-an important ,book that does not
appear in Strohm's bibliography-historians have been misled by the nineteenth-century invention of "feudalism" and thus have failed to appreciate
the heterogeneous forms of community based on horizontal links that existed
throughout Western Europe for centuries. (Reynolds even denies that the
term "feudalism" is of any value to medieval historians.) Strohm fails, then,
to take sufficient account of the variety of horizontal communities during the
heyday of "descending verticality": fraternities and guilds, villages and parishes, urban settlements, and national or regnal communities. The point is
that any social formation can be simultaneously described as vertical and horizontal. Strohm's historical thesis, while it enables him to describe a very real
tension in Chaucer's professional and poetic career, is far too simplified to
provide a convincing basis for his larger historical claims.
A second problem is that Strohm tends to blur the distinction between abstract political theorizing and real political practice. The literary historian will
no doubt find the theories of a Marsilius of Padua or a John of Paris (see
Strohm's discussion, 146-51) more accessible to scrutiny than the records of
legal disputes, for instance, where mundane political conflicts are documented. The danger here is of succumbing to an idealist version of history
where academic "thought" (see 147, bottom) is substituted for the less tidy
realities of political practice.
Strohm's writing is frequently vague and imprecise. One example must
suffice here: Chaucer responded to "a historically and ideologically charged
moment" (143). There are occasional signs of careless editing. The retaining
(retinuimus) mentioned in Richard II's confirmation of Edward Ill's grant of
an annuity to Chaucer "is probably only in that implied sense in which anyone receiving a life annuity may be considered retained" (21, italics in original); by page 34 the same confirmation "clearly specifies that Chaucer has
been retained ('retinuimus') ...." On page 188, note 5 erroneously suggests
that thirteenth-century England knew counts as well as earls.
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Strohm reveals in a telling note that he would 'locate the principle conflict
in Chaucer's poetry where he seems to mean to put it-between contending
hierarchical and antihierarchical ideologies-rather than between a fusion of
these elements on the one hand and a repressed ensemble representing a
partially formed peasant consciousness on the other' (226, my italics). Some
medievalists will doubtless be annoyed at Strohm's frequent emphasis on
ideology; yet in Strohm's account, Chaucer remains a sovereign subject fully
in control of his intentions in "communicative situations." For readers looking

for a more radical critique, this book will be frustrating in its ambivalence
towards its own political project. While Strohm seems comfortable enough
with the notion of a former age of feudalism, he seems curiously reluctant
to name the 'rising, commercial counterhegemony" to "a fading feudal
hegemony" (142) or the "cynical postfeudal arrangements" (109) as capitalism. This reluctance seems especially odd, given his Wtial passing reference
to the on-going debate on the transition from feudalism to capitalism (x-xi),
his sympathetic references to the ideas of Marxist literary critics, and his investment in what he insists is a Marxist sense of mediation (see 172). Paul
Strohm, like many medievalists nowadays, wants to avoid the pious orthodoxies of right-wing critics but is not ready to part company with their liberal-humanist opponents, despite his frequent reliance on leftist historians
and literary theorists (see 186-87 nn. 1-4, 7-l1).
Despite the reservations expressed in this review, however, Social Chaucer
is a major accomplishment that will no doubt stimulate much further discussion. We should all be thankful to Strohm for showing in great detail the extent to which there is indeed a 'social Chaucer:

The Johns Hopkins University

R. James Goldstein

Wordsworth: The Sense of History by Alan Liu. Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1989. Pp. xvi

+ 726. $39.50.

Although it is possible that, by the time this appears, the following assertion will seem anachronistic, 1 will hazard it anyway: in romantic studies and
in Wordsworth studies in particular, we are at present in a moment (I was
going to say "in an age") of historicism. It is possible, of course, to regard this
"moment" merely cynically: that "history" is the ready and easy way to expand a text in order to say something new and interesting about it. 'Tintem
Abbey" with the French Revolution superadded is, after all, a larger and substantially different text than the biographical, phenomenological or generic
poem on which a host of commentators have already offered their interpretations. One can also, to be sure, regard the "historical tum" in a more positive

light: as an indispensable corrective to a textually or artifactually-oriented
criticism which, for all its apparent rigor and 'objectivity: is motivated by a
range of extra-textual initiatives, whose bearing is proven either in the way
such imperatives are necessarily concealed or, worse, in the way they become

dependent on the poetry for validation. The tenets of deconstruction, like
those of humanism, are valid in criticism, it often seems, not because they are
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always/already valid but rather because Shelley or Wordsworth effectively
says so, Nevertheless, regardless of the way we characterize the tUrn to historicism in literary studies-whether as a tum from conventional literary history or as a swerving from more recent fashions of literary history-one
thing about it is inescapably clear. And this quite simply is that it remainsin the term by which it has come to be known-a "new historicism." It is a
movement, in other words, that not only would have been inconceivable a
decade earlier, but a criticism that stands firmly if somewhat apostately on
the shoulders of the very criticism-specifically poststructuralism-it apparently finds wanting.
By no means am I accusing the new historicism or any new historicist of
bad faith. To make use of the work of one's predecessors and contemporaries
is, after all, to be a responsible and responsive professional, Still, what is
striking about the new historicism, particularly in romantic studies, is that although it takes as its raison d'etre the dead end of deconstructive formalism,
it nevertheless follows and even exceeds deconstruction's demystificatory
project. In the hands of, say, Paul de Man, romanticism was merely representative of a western metaphysical tradition, whose arbitrariness romantic
writing both suppresses and exposes. Although other literature would undoubtedly have sufficed for de Man, romantic writing, with its phenomenological bent, was apparently the literature that de Man knew best as well as the
literature on which theoretically-based criticism had, at the time he was writing, focused much of its attention.
In the new historicism-despite often vigorous protests to the contrarysomething very similar exists. Although romanticism is at issue now for what
purports to be its own sake-because romantic writing remains, when all is
said and done, a literature subject to conditions and to an environment materially different from our own-its demystification, or subjection to what one
new historicist terms" deconstructive materialism," amounts still to a universal cure. Not only, in other words, does the new historicism attempt to heal
or otherwise resuscitate romanticism by effectively writing or uncovering
what romantic writing itself could not possibly bear or represent; it seeks,
chiefly through massive doses of historical data, to foreground and to cure
contemporary readers of a similar resistance of history which has apparently
sapped them of the ability to resist what Jerome McGann has termed "the
romantic ideology."
Indeed, like Napoleon, whose brilliant military strategy Alan Liu painstakingly describes, the new historicism always adopts a two-pronged method
of attack: it attacks the liberal ideology of romanticism itself, where the recourse to quietism and emphasis on the individual merely returns romantic
literature to the very hegemony it purportedly opposes. And second, and just
as important, the new historicism attacks the contemporary reader, whose
tendency to read romantic literature as history, as the representation of something or someone or of some sensibility, is problematized by the various
ways in which the history that is "not there" in the poetry-for Uu's purposes the French Revolution and the social and egalitarian initiatives that
cluster about it-is unfortunately the nothing or "absence" that also is.
I have indulged these opening remarks for two reasons: first, to give a general background to Liu's important study, and second, in order to emphasize
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what I take to be a conflict that Liu's, more than any other new historical
reading of Wordsworth-induding, for example, James Chandler's Wordsworth's Second Nature, Marjorie Levinson's Wordsworth's Great Period Poems,
McGann's The Romantic Ideology, and David Simpson's Wordsworth's Historical Imagination-makes compellingly dear. And this is that while new historical readings are, by their own daim, more ethical than other modes of interpretation, the historicized Wordsworth who emerges in these readings is no
more ethically constituted than the deconstructed Wordsworth of de Man or
the deconstructable Wordsworth of Geoffrey Hartman, both of whom are in
different ways poets of failure and contradiction. Thanks to the new historicism and to its brilliant practitioners, we undoubtedly know more than before about the road Wordsworth could not take or, more properly, about the
Wordsworth who could not travel a road only recently demarcated. But
whether such criticism, either as deconstruction, or as the reconstruction now

of a suppressed politics, represents an ethical alternative to other modes of
interpretation-either those sympathetic with Wordsworth in their putative
denial of what, according to Liu, is "history: or to readings that are seemingly antipathetic in the way they merely marshal Wordsworth in a still
larger skepticism-is, I think, open to question.
Liu, for his part, is acutely aware of this problem, and he naturally distinguishes his normatively based demystification of Wordsworth from a more
purely theoretical deconstruction of Wordsworth's poetry on the grounds of
"value." Deconstruction, Liu contends, is limited from "adequately finishing
the task of correction or evaluation" in its unwillingness to "dedar[e]" a
"normative frame of reference upon which to secure the determination of
value"-which it merely translates, he observes, "into ontological and episte-

mological terms." Deconstruction "cannot, that is, knowingly evaluate the
transient motives, as opposed to timeless being or truth, of doctrinal pOSition
-of having a "right" position as opposed simply to plural Positions"-any
more than it can "correc[t] the Word ... in light of ... the felt plenitude of
history, the absence ... that is constitutive of what we mean by cultural
reality" (393-94).
Several things are dear from the above comments: that criticism, as Liu
would have it, is indeed a corrective; that this correction is achieved by determining certain historical contingencies of value; and that such critical determinations are, of necessitYI value-laden. Only a position with values, after
all, with some ground at once tangible and ethical, can properly engage in
the business of evaluation. Thus, in the very way that historical method establishes the transient motives behind a "right" or, in Wordsworth's case,
"doctrinal position: so the methodized establishment of those motives, Liu
suggests, is itself a "right" or a "correct" as well as a "corrective" position. This
is so because of the historicist's willingness to take a stand, where deconstruction in its particular fidelity to "positions"-to the "both/and" rather
than to the Neither/er"-refuses, and more importantly, in the way historicization necessarily fills the 'absence"-the nothing or indeterminacy that is
always there in the poetry according to deconstruction-with the "plenitude
of history."
Wordsworth: The Sense of History proceeds, then, to fill the absence through
the rigorous application of a double-focus. That is, it sets about reversing the
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trajectory of history denied in Wordsworth, and of the undecidability thereby
fostered, not simply through its recreation of a discrete and remarkably nuanced political and social "reality," but even more significantly through witnessing-in what is now, of course, a critical act-the veritable destruction of
this reality, which is Wordsworth's domestication of "historical emergency
... in the form of its denial" (181). Liu manages this double-movement with
a rigor and intensity-and with a virtual obsession with his material-that
are indeed singular and are likely to remain a standard for this kind of analysis. Nevertheless, he conducts his investigation with an ethical fervor and excessiveness that at times hinders the authority of this still massively authoritative study, with its over five-hundred pages of text and an another twohundred of apparatus.
The fervor is most evident in Liu's "sense of history" which, for all its success filling in the absence, cannot abide another absence or contingency that
is also history: those very denials as it tums out-Wordsworth's negotiations
as a mature, less than perfect, human who found himself under the compulsion to write-that are as much history in the end (and as timely a history I
would argue) as the various other emergencies that were triaged along the
way. Literary history as a discipline has long argued this point, and in reiterating it I do not mean to sound anachronistic. I mean to stress rather that,
apart from a dauntingly fail-safe method that makes the seeming irrelevance
or inapplicability of history to the poetry-for example the bearing of the
family concept as it evolved in the eighteenth century on the constitution of
selfhood in The Borderers-proof positive of its denial and hence of its centrality, there is the very real question here of whether a magisterial study of
the not-Wordsworth-of what Wordsworth effectively left behind-is more
necessary or, if you prefer, a more necessary study regarding Wordsworth
than those studies (my own included) which continue to make lessons of the
history that is poetry.
I do not pretend to have the answer to this, and I am less convinced,
thanks to Liu and others, of the validity of a counterposition, indeed my
counterposition. The only place, in fact, where such a position continues to
gain a foothold is on the question of value, where reading one way is apparently more ethical now than reading another way. For it is precisely in those
moments where Liu is most revelatory and, by his own assertion, most correct that he is most in need of correction. I do not mean by this that he is incorrect in a critical or purely literary sense, where his attention to textual particulars and to the bearing of history on those particulars is probably unrivaled; Liu stands to be corrected, rather, in the way that both writing, and
the invariably imperfect, indecisive negotiations of which poetry (and Wordsworth's poetry preeminently) remains a record, are according to him incorrigible-or worse, COrrigible only after the fact.
That is, for all its attention to history, including the particulars of Wordsworth's life, there is it seems to me insufficient appreciation in Wordsworth:
The Sense of History of the quotidian which is also history-of being Wordsworth or for that matter anyone in time-of which Wordsworth's poetry is,
for better or for worse, a representation. Because there is so much at stake in
the "history" Liu narrates, the possibility of there being less, indeed far less,
at stake in Wordsworth is simply inconceivable. It is not enough for Liu that
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life, in unfortunate imitation of the Wordsworthian lyric perhaps, is a succession of moments-of negotiations, compromises, swervings and aporias-of,
dare I say it, "spots of time," Rather it becomes necessary for Liu, and I
would add uncompromisingly necessary, that life mean more and that its
meaning somehow hinge upon its completability in the critical act. It is necessary in other words that narration annihilate description, that Wordsworth
in time-a Wordsworth merely readable and fathomable-be always less
important and always less a figure in history than the Wordsworth whose
historicization renders him at once manageable and accountable.
I have said enough on this score and, in putative defense of way of a reading that some would call deconstructiv€, have paradoxically come out sounding like Matthew Arnold. What I wish to emphasize in what space remains
(and what may already be surmised from the passion with which I have engaged it) is the importance and usefulness of Liu's achievement. Beginning
indeed with a suggestive analysis of the Napoleonic resonances (and the revolutionary history behind them) in the Simplon episode of The Prelude, Liu
proceeds, tl:trough remarkably nuanced and capacious discussions of both selected works-An Evening Walk, Descriptive Sketches, The Borderers, The
Ruined Cottage, The Prelude-and their "history," to demonstrate the various,
often oblique, ways history is denied in Wordsworth's writing as a condition
of its realization. Furthermore, in what may strike some readers as surprisingly categorical, the history denied in Wordsworth, according to Liu, is essentially the French Revolution. Denied not only specifically, as the suppressed referent of the earlier loco-descriptive poetry and later as a referent
variously screened in The Prelude, the Revolution is denied more symbolically in the resistance to specific political and/or social initiatives in formative works such as The Borderers and The Ruined Cottage. It may not have
been Liu's intention to be this categorical, to equate all "history" in (or out of)
Wordsworth with political good and the denial of history with apostasy and
betrayal. But it is symptomatic of his fervor that things work out this way.
Thus, we move from a perspicacious reading of Wordsworth's early poems,
including Descriptive Sketches, which describes Europe at the time of the Revolution but not the Revolution itself, to a treatment of The Borderers, where
the "revolution" is denied in the way the bourgeois family unit (of which the
self is an extrapolation) is defined by its isolation from moral taint. This taint,
Liu argues, is figured in Wordsworth's play by the spectre of Matilda's illegitimacy and Mortimer's horror at its possibility, which in turn registers Wordsworth's own anxiety about, and ultimately his refusal to accept, the idea of a
community or family of men. In the early descriptive poems Liu not only attends to textual particulars, for example the irruption of the Revolution or of
a revolutionary consciousness in images and episodes which relate to and/or
bear comparison with the representation of the Revolution as it developed in
France; he is equally attentive to the politics of the picturesque, which is
Wordsworth's mode here: both to the real politics of enclosure and its physical effect on the English landscape, as well as to the more displaced-but no
less political (if somewhat liberal)-aesthetics of containment by which, as
the poetry shows, the Revolution is expressed commensurate with its suppression. Nor is Liu at all reductive in his reading here or inclined along the
path of least resistance. Sidestepping the obvious political thematics in The
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Borderers, which cluster around the question of regicide and insurrection, he
detects within the playa more elusive and, as its turns Dut, more palpable
history: specifically, the evolution of the bourgeois family (and by extension
the self) as a legitimate social unit removed, by self-legitimizing narrative,
from an "impoverished," illegitimate "other" (252).
Liu is just as unpredictable and as informative in his discussion of The
Ruined Cottage. Eschewing, once again, the conventional and somewhat selfcongratulatory conception of the poem as a humane document forever in
sympathy with its tragic subjects, Liu offers a brilliantly historicized analogy
between the precarious condition of weavers (such as the poem's character
Robert) and that of Wordsworth himself who had aspired to support himself
by the labor of his writing. In this way, Liu shows precisely what is at issue
in making rural tragedy the occasion of a lyric and richly symbolic representation. For in the" capitalization" of rural impoverishment in poetic meaning
-or by what amounts, in effect, to poetic genius-the act of imagination
(which in Wordsworth's case was to have been underwritten by an inheritance) has a peculiar parity with the very labor, to which it compares quite
favorably now, and is thereby "valued on a par with any other specie of human work." In "Wordsworth's economy of lyric," Liu concludes, "[r]iches
arise through sublimated denials of normal economy: though you have less,
you shan have more; though you share, you shall own; though you merely
imagine, you shall labor" (353).
With this in mind, it should come as no surprise that The Prelude, which
marks the apotheosis of Wordsworth's "lyric" self, would also "celebrate the
death of [the poet's] revolutionary spirit" (366) in "a discourse that affirms-inorder-to-deny the absences, differentiations, mutabilities, 'elsewhereness,' or
otherness of history" (361). Far from representing history, and with it a revolutionary spirit, the books of The Prelude devoted to the poet's experience in
France manage, more than say the early loco-descriptive poems (which by
dint of sheer contemporaneity were at least responsive to the Revolution) to
allow '''true history' to dematerialize" (377). With history rendered insubstantial there emerges "a new, transcendental authority of history: Wordsworth's
'1."' The Revolution books-and hence the Revolution itself-are "recentered
within a field of purely personal meaning" (384-85), within an "ideology of
self" which, according to Liu, constitutes Wordsworth's "greatest denial of
history" (388).
There is much more to Liu's analysis of The Prelude, including a quite remarkable anatomy of Wordsworth's politics of patriotism, reflected pre-eminently in the spots of time, whose paradoxical effect was to enable Wordsworth to imitate Napoleon (including Napoleon the strategist) in the very act
of opposing him. And there is also, by way of conclusion, some careful and
circumspect consideration of Wordsworth's later, more overtly nationalistic
poetry as a vehicle for readmitting history and militating against lyric. As one
who has also struggled to see something contestational about the later, antiromantic Wordsworth, I can only applaud Liu's efforts to establish a continuity in Wordsworth's writing even if that continuity comes, as it does here, to
something less than a recognition on the poet's part. Wordsworth: The Sense of
History in fact elicits applause at every tum. It is thorough, stunningly wellresearched (especially in the historical sections) and enormously intelligent.
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Some readers will undoubtedly find it too intelligent or, as the phrase goes,
too clever by half. But this, they should know, is an indulgence amply justified by everything else here (not the least being Liu's generous acknowledgment of the work of others), and which Alan Liu, on a more personal note,
has clearly earned the right to, having toiled at this labor long before it was
either fashionable or before it could be modeled on so decisive an achievement.

Rutgers University, New Brunswick

William Galperin

Soundings in Critical Theory by Dominick LaCapra. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989. Pp. xii

+ 2l3. $29.95 (cloth); $10.95 (paper).

The widespread, contemporary interest in interdisciplinary research and
curricula has produced relatively few academic scholars who defy disciplinary boundaries and address 'theoretical problems that cross the departmental structures of intellectual life in the modern university. Dominick LaCapra's work has therefore become both exceptional and increasingly influential through its self-conscious, interdisciplinary exploration of the
connections between literature, history, social theory, psychoanalysis, literary
criticism, and contemporary culture. LaCapra pursues the challenges of interdisciplinary analysis beyond the cliches of curricular review committees into
the complex writings of modern Europe's most influential critical thinkers, all
of whom relied on interdisciplinary perspectives and developed theories with
interdisciplinary significance. This new collection of seven critical essays reiterates many of the themes that have appeared elsewhere in LaCapra's work
(e.g., in Rethinking Intellectual History: Texts, Contexts, Language or in History
and Criticism) and attracted the attention of a wide academic audience: the
implications of poststructuralist theory for the study of history, the importance of a critical dialogue with the past, the complexity of internal contestations or dialogues within literary, historical, and theoretical texts, the intricacy of the interactions between texts and contexts, and the value of camivalesque traditions for both social relations and literary style. Soundings in
Critical Theory thus serves on one level as a restatement of LaCapra's earlier
advocacy of a critical, dialogic intellectual history that draws on literary
theory to develop new readings of influential texts and contexts in the Western tradition.
But this book also goes significantly beyond his previous work in its focus
on possible directions for a transformative, critical theory that might help to
change the ideologies, politics, culture, and institutions of contemporary societies. LaCapra has not lost his interest in history or literature, but his critical
aspirations seem to have become more explicit and more ambitious. He is
looking for an intellectual history that would change the present or the future
as it reinterprets the past, though he recognizes (realistically enough) that intellectual history and other forms of critical, theoretical writing are relegated
to the (harmless?) margins of our commodified, mass culture. What, then, can
critical theorists/intellectual historians do to challenge a culture whose his-
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tory generates the objects of their research as well as the limits and possibilities of their thought and action?
The answer to that question emerges gradually and somewhat unsystematically in the essays of this book, despite LaCapra's steadfast resistance to
simple solutions that might suggest closure, totalization, essentialism or teleology. He typically approaches cultural problems through "dialogic interventions" rather than through the comprehensive order of a systematic treatise.
Yet certain themes appear often in the book and provide some directions for
critical theorists and intellectual historians who must inevitably remain uncertain about their future destinations. In simplest terms, LaCapra argues that
the two-sided, critical project of the Frankfurt School (the attempt to reconcile Marx and Freud) has given way to a new, three-sided attempt to work
through the critical connections between Marxism, psychoanalysis, and
poststructuralism. The complex, triangular interaction of these theoretical
perspectives informs LaCapra's approach to history and shapes both the formal structure and explicit argument in this book; more specifically, each of
these traditions is used to contest or supplement or extend the others. For example, the tendency of Marxists or Freudians to propose theoretical closures
(economic determinism, castration anxiety) receives Derridean critiques of the
displaced metaphysical desire for totalizing explanations, but then deconstruction receives criticism for formalist tendencies that radically de-emphasize what Marx and Freud have analyzed in the historical world outside of
written texts. LaCapra's critical method and his suggestions for future work
in critical theory/intellectual history thus rely on a triangular exchange that
is never simply closed and never simply dissolved into synthesis.
In addition to the broad theoretical triangle (Marx, Freud, Derrida) that operates throughout the book, LaCapra refers briefly to contemporary historiographical triangles (dass-race-gender) and also develops triangular debates
within most of the specific chapters. His self-reflective "dialogic" style often
leads him to explore history and theory by comparing the similarities and differences in pairs of well-known authors, but LaCapra always enters the dialogue to establish another triangle. This triadic pattern shows up most notably in a response to the ways that Roger Chartier and Robert Damton interpret symbols, in an analysis of Romanticism and "the temporality of rhetoric"
in works by M. H. Abrams and Paul de Man, in a comparative exploration of
culture and ideology in the theories of Clifford Geertz and Marx, and in a
reading of "Marx after Derrida." The variety of authors who are analyzed in
these chapters points to the extraordinary range of LaCapra's interests as he
follows his principal subjects into the works of Rousseau, Wordsworth, Baudelaire, Foucault, and others who supplement the exchanges. Although he
carefully resists the conventional desire to bring these exchanges to satisfying
conclusions, his movement toward a new critical theory comes back repeatedly to the triangle of Marx, Freud, and Derrida.
As LaCapra describes it, a transformative critical theory (or historical methodology) should focus on at least three recurring problems in modern culture:
(1) the pervasive commodification of cultural artifacts, (2) the role of transference in the study of cultural objects or traditions, and (3) the distortions and
dangers that accompany the reliance on binary oppositions in society and
thought. Significantly, these issues coincide with prominent themes in the
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works of Marx, Freud, and Derrida, though the main concerns of these theorists differ and mostly refer in each case to only one of LaCapra's three major
themes. Marx points critical theorists and historians toward the economic dimensions of cultural life and contlnues to offer an extremely useful account
of commodity exchanges in capitalist societies. Indeed, LaCapra suggests that
no would-be theorist can ignore the role of the economy in a culture that is
Hmediated by the market and converted into a commodity bought and sold in
accordance with market criteria" (141). The "commodified character" of modem, mass culture threatens all advocates of cultural transformation because
"it is difficult to avoid the general conclusion that the level of commodification and capital investment in mass culture is so high that ideologically reinforcing or adaptive forces tend to be marked or even preponderant and that
'utopian' elements tend to be restricted to contained fantasy and wishful
thinking" (3). Even the most daring aesthetic experiments are quickly taken
up by advertising and absorbed into a commodity system that can still be
critically analyzed with insights from Marx's discussion of commodity fetishism in the first volume of Capital.
The critical study of commodification, though, must move beyond economiGS to a self-analysis of "transferential relations." Drawing explicitly on Freud,
LaCapra uses the term "transference" to describe "the manner in which the
problems at issue in the object of study reappear (or are repeated with variations) in the work of the historian" (37). For the historian of capitalist social
relations or commodity systems, this transferential relation could take the
form of an archival fetishism in which the unselfconscious scholar obsessively collects and protects data with the entrepreneurial passion of a capitalist speculator (the data acquires the exchange value of other commodities). In
contrast to an unreflective scholar-speculator, the critical theorist or historian
might follow the Freudian analyst in developing an awareness of transferential relations (which exist also between scholars or between teachers and students) and in challenging the dream of "recounting the past purely in its own
terms and for its own sake" (38-39). In other words, psychoanalysis offers a
method for thinking about how the historian's voice enters accounts of the
past and how the past enters the historian-somewhat like the analyst and
analysand interact and disorient each other. Transferential interactions can
never be entirely overcome (they are necesssary for all forms of analysis), but
LaCapra wants them to be recognized and subjected to critique.
The transferential relation between historians and the historical Hother"
undermines binary oppositions (e.g., present historian/past reality) and leads
LaCapra toward his third critical guide, Derrida. Among the many important
perspectives that deconstruction brings to a reformulated critical theory, LaCapra finds the greatest significance in the critique of totalizing theories and
binary oppositions. Both the desire for closure (metaphysical tradition) and
the tendency to order the world in binary relations (logic of scapegoating)
carry social and theoretical implications that LaCapra's critical theorist-historian ,,@ find highly objectionable. The danger of totalizing theories appears
regularly in political systems, philosophies, and religions that deny the legitimacy of other voices, other possibilities, and other histories. This totalizing
pattern is especially evident in state-sanctioned ideologies and faiths, but the
use of binary oppositions or scapegoating can be found as often in democratic societies as in one-party states.
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Here is the point at which LaCapra finds Derridean insights to be of greatest value in developing a critical theory that moves beyond Marx or Freud
(without rejecting or ignoring their insights). "One of the most potent institutional implications of the poststructuralist critique of binary oppositions,"
writes LaCapra, "is a critique of the scapegoat mechanism .... The critical
task is to work out alternatives to it. A different understanding of institutions
as settings for the interaction of social individuals, marked by internal alterity
yet committed or obligated to one another, is a necessary step in this respect"
(24). The problem, as LaCapra recognizes, lies in the nearly universal tendency of cultures and societies to define their identity and their essence in
opposition to unpure "others" who must be scapegoated and rejected. Binary
thinking informs all nationalist ideologies and enters constantly into the political response to the complexities of social life. The American "War on
Drugs," for example, relies mainly on binary oppositions (past purity/present
decline, good Americans/evil, Hispanic drug lords, white/black, law/crime,
Bush/Noriega, etc.) which vastly distort the nature of a significant social
problem.
The preceding summary of three key themes in LaCapra's search for a new
critical theory simplifies and narrates an argument that never takes this precise form. There is much more to be said about his "dialogue" with Marx,
Freud, and Derrida, and there is even more to say about his responses to
other contemporary critics, historians, and anthropologists. Yet most of his
specific criticisms and programmatic statements (such as they are) draw in
various ways on his concern with commodification, transference, and binary
oppositions. Within this overall framework, however, Soundings in Critical
Theory addresses a number of specific issues that I cannot discuss here. For
example, LaCapra stresses the importance of historical contexts in opposition
to formalists (Paul de Man receives particular criticism on this point), but he
also wants to avoid all kinds of simple contextualism (he questions both the
new historicism in literary studies and conventional social history). He repeatedly challenges the desire for closure in historiography and literary criticism (Robert Damton and M. H. Abrams give him examples of the problem),
but he also accepts the necessity of distinctions, hypotheses, and "articulations" in the study of history and culture (postmodernism's "indiscriminate
reliance on techniques of fragmentation" [1] seems to be the danger here). He
urges readers to think critically about canon formation and to situate such
traditions histOrically (his critique of the sacralization of "great books"), and
yet he simultaneously defends the importance of major works in "the tradition" because they carry contestatory, critical themes (I.e., he objects to
"canon-busters" who simply condemn "great books" curricula). He questions
the structure of academic and social organizations and favors the transgression of inherited institutional boundaries, yet he strongly affirms the importance of institutional life and the necessity of limits within which institutions
must operate. He acknowledges Clifford Geertz's contribution to the study of
symbolic meaning, but he calls for a more differentiated analysis of culture
that might draw again on "a modified Marxist conception of ideology" (135)
-that is to say a renewed attention to the links between ideas and social interests. He proposes a continuing engagement with Marx, but a Marx who offers the possibility (after Derrida) of a "supplemented dialectic" rather than
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the teleological closure of Hegelianism or the scientistic closure of positivism.
He advocates a close connection between critical theory and intellectual history, yet he notes the explicit resistance of many historians (his representative figure is J.G.A. Pocock) to forms of historiography that might also become forms of criticism.

This list of intersecting oppositions in LaCapra's book could be extended,
but the pattern should be apparent. Although he subjects much contemporary scholarship and culture to critical analysis, LaCapra works with exceptional self-consciousness to avoid the scapegoaling of what he criticizes in
others and to go beyond the analytic level of critical reversals or inversions.
He wants to develop a strong critical position without replicating traditional
critiques that simply condemn their opponents as wrong. This alternative
critical project thus escapes the mythmaking of simple solutions to complex
problems, but it also runs the risk of a bland middle position (finding good
and bad in all of the overlapping, analytic poles it identifies) or the risk of
self-contradiction whenever it enters into controversies or debates (repeating
the polemical tendency to scapegoat).
LaCapra's response to these risks stresses the importance of language in
ways that make the prose style a crucial dimension of the critical project. He
challenges the blandness of a middle position and the possible scapegoating
in his own critiques of others by writing highly nuanced sentences and constantly limiting the claims of his arguments. This stylistic strategy clearly separates LaCapra's wriling from the work of consensus bullders who provide
the comforts of a reconclling synthesis or describe the "good points" of all
sides in order to propose the reasonable compromise of differences; LaCapra
is not looking for consensus or common sense. In fact, he frequently criticizes

historians and theorists such as Robert Damton or Clifford ·Geertz for writing
in a direct, commonsense style that glosses over critical problems. An extremely "readable" writer exemplifies for LaCapra the widespread cultural
tendency toward commodification which undercuts the possible development
of critical theories and critical histories. "Commodified language use extricates the 'symbolic' from the work and play of language ... and makes it
into the transcendental object seemingly conveyed in its transparent purity
by an unworried, untroubled style" (82). The stylistic problem for would-be
critical writers (as LaCapra notes) derives from the tendency of language to
lose all critical force as it becomes simplified and commodified. The word
"revolutionary," for example, comes to designate a new product, and the
mass media reduce social, political, and cultural conflicts to the cliches of
television "sound bites." And yet how does critical theory enter into political
and cultural debates-the public sphere-if it does not rely on language that
most people in the culture commonly use and understand?
The obvious historical example of accessible, critical prose would be the
polemical works of Marx. Simplifying the intricacies of his theoretical writings, Marx's Communist Manifesto employed a direct, polemical language that
helped to mobilize political movements and transform modem societies.
LaCapra's prose (like Marx's theoretical work) is neither obscurantist nor incomprehensible, but its complex nuances do not generate slogans for a popular social movement. (A new, critical manifesto? Perhaps this: "Commodity
consumers of the world might at times unite; you may have little to lose but
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your transferential relations and binary oppositions!") The difference between
a complex, critical language and an accessible, commodified language raises
unresolved questions about how critical theory can support transfonnative
action without losing its audience or reinforcing the culture it seeks to
change. LaCapra does not really answer these questions, though he tends to
see more danger in commodified language than in difficult prose.
The problem of comprehensible language is related to another problem for
LaCapra's transformative critical theory: the appeal of binary oppositions. His
work offers many perceptive warnings about the dangers of binary thinking
and shows how this form of thought (like commodified language) can easily
be assimilated into the cultural or political status quo; the simple reversal of
hierarchies does not end repression or exploitation or scapegoating-as the
history of political revolutions has demonstrated all too clearly. Yet how can
a transfonnative social movement mobilize a popular political and cultural
base without the appealing simplicity of binary oppositions? All "successful"
historical movements or ideologies (e.g., Christianity, nationalism, socialism,
fascism, racism, sexism, and even the Enlightenment) have depended on
such oppositions and have sustained their identities through binary categories. This historical pattern suggests that a focused, critical, contestatory
movement can scarcely avoid the need to define its opponents on some level
as radically "other" if it is to attract the wide support that brings about
change in modem societies.
LaCapra is acutely sensitive to the historical power of binary thinking, but
he characteristically refuses to offer any simple alternatives or solutions to
this pervasive social and ideological pattern. "In social life," he writes,
"scapegoating provides instant purification and the ability to localize the
source of contamination in an individual or group bearing the most recognizable difference from the ingroup" (24). This scapegoating process contributes
much of the passion, solidarity and identity for social institutions and political cultures, and it poses immense problems for a transformative social
movement that would reject the traditional recourse to binary oppositions.
Indeed, the search for a non-binary social and theoretical model would seem
to push LaCapra from the Western philosophical tradition toward Eastern
traditions (not explicitly evoked) which recognize the overlapping, supplementary connection between all categories and their partial opposites.
These are only some of the problems that emerge in LaCapra's exploration
of critical theory-problems that are raised but not solved. The open-endedness of his book is nevertheless appropriate for his own theory and method,
and it also seems appropriate for the present historical moment. We do not
need a new theory of closure. What we do need, however, and what LaCapra's important, challenging book offers, is some new ways to think about
historical processes and ethical or political judgments. LaCapra distances
himself in this book from some of his earlier affiliation with Derridean criticism, yet he continues to suggest ways in which deconstructive readings can
be used to extend other critiques of society, culture, and politics. This imaginative, critical project helps to counter the charge that deconstruction leads
towilrd a denial of history or the abandonment of ethical and political
choices. On the contrary, the critique of transcendental signifiers, absolute
groundings, and simple polarities renders the search for historical under-
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standing and ethical decisionmaking all the more important because it rejects
the possibility of a consoling or clarifying escape from history.
LaCapra comes close to summarizing the implications of his approach to
history and his critical "soundings" in a concise passage that suggests why
this book (like others he has written) will be important for a wide range of
intellectual disciplines:
The approach I am suggesting refers critique to a discursive and argumentative context that itself has no absolute or ultimate grounds-a
variable context that cannot even be labeled "pragmatic." This approach has the minimal value of making explicit what processes of inquiry and argument have always been, and it does not pretend to any
transcendental or fully systematic (or "totalized") perspective. Rather, it
insists on, indeed affirms, the problematic connection of scientific inquiry and ethicopolitical judgment. This approach further implies that
the notion of unity or order is limited, contextually variable, and internally contested; but it does not simply eliminate that notion. Nor does
it invalidate the idea of accuracy h:t propositions or the role of hypothesis testing. (151-52)

This description of "critique"-with its emphasis on language and contexts,
its rejection of absolute grounding and transcendental perspectives, its attention to historical processes of inquiry that "have always been," its insistence
on complex links between science and ethics, its challenge to and limited
reaffirmation of notions of order, and its acceptance of propositions and hypotheses-indicates why Dominick LaCapra's work should continue to attract attention from both analysts and critics of history, literature, culture,
and contemporary society. Soundings in Critical Theory will not change the
world, but it should stimulate the thinking and analysiS and even the action
of those who still turn to books to criticize or redefine or alter the history in
which they live.

University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Lloyd S. Kramer

Professing Literature by Gerald Graff. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1987. $24.95.

Professing Literature is a breakthrough book, the first full-length effort to
describe the history of literature instruction in American colleges. Starting
with nineteenth-century predecessors of English departments and concluding
with the 1980s debate over theory, it's full, timely, and pertinent. In the short
time it has been out, Graff's provocative book has been forcing scholars, critics, and teachers to rethink their relationship to the profession of English.
Such a reexamination is precisely Graff's aim. His book is history with a
purpose; he believes that since English as a discipline has never been adequately conceptualized, English departments have never had a real sense of
what they stood for. Graff wants English to deal with its conflicts by teaching
them, making the disputes over ends and means the actual subject of scholarship and pedagogy. He shapes his book around the struggles that he re-
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gards as formative for the profession: classicists versus modem language
scholars in the mid nineteenth century; research investigators versus generalists at the tum of the century; historical scholars versus critics in the twenties
and thirties; New Humanists versus New Critics in the late thirties and forties; academic critics versus literary journalists and culture critics in the sixties; and finally critics and scholars versus theorists in the 1970s and 80s.
One of Graff's most telling points is that many of these disputes were
never really resolved. The spectacular growth of English meant conflict could
be avoided by the expedient of adding another specialist. Thus when women
raised tough questions about the canon in the 1970s, departments hired more
women to "do" literature from a female perspective. Graff claims that this
pattern was fully established at the tum of the century, when the dispute between philology and literature was "solved" by hiring literature specialists,
not by removing philologists. The field coverage model of English studies,
subject of some of Graff's strongest attacks, has permitted English departments to finesse the tough question of priorities.
What makes Professing Literature so successful is the aculness of Graff's
analysis. His powerfully sympathetic intelligence allows him to understand
and appreciate the points on both sides of burning issues. For instance, his
brief account of the historians' attacks on the critics (e.g., Rosamund Tuve VB.
T. S. Eliot and Douglas Bush vs. Cleanth Brooks) is a marvel of insight. Graff
can explain complex polemics cogently and gracefully. And behind the
shrewd and impartial analyses of the controversies lies Graff's irenic purpose; he genuinely wants tolerance rather than rancor, and his attempt to
understand the conflicts, is fair, rigorous, and consistently interesting.
Also valuable is the attention Graff pays to important yet poorly understood figures in English studies: Joel Spingam, a dazzling critic and scholar
who gave up on the profession in the teens; Norman Foerster, whose presence was felt throughout the 1920s and 30s (Foerster's impact on composition studies remains an unexplored link); and R. S. Crane, whose difficult
later criticism benefits greatly from Graff's sympathetic and informed analysis.
One question occasioned by Professing Literature is whether it is what Graff
terms it on his title page, an "institutional history"-that is, the history of the
English department as an institution-or whether it is instead a history of
critical trends and practices. The book seems much more like the latter, since
it makes no attempt to present either a comprehensive or a carefully selected
portrait of English departments within the context of higher education over
the past century and a half. The colleges Graff refers to are almost all elite, a
justifiable choice in a study of key ideas or leading trends, but hardiy likely
to provide a true portrait of the full range of literature studies.
Professing Literature makes its readers realize how much remains to be
learned. For instance, the question of who became English professors seems
crucial, connecting as it does with a pronounced Anglophile strain running
through American life. Anglophilia explains more than just gentility and a
taste for pipes, sherry, and tweeds; it has often determined what gets studied
and how: the Walpole industry at Yale; Johnsonians; Janeites; certain medievalists; some of the admirers of Henry James; devotees of Bloomsbury. Similarly, very little is known about numbers of teachers and of majors, of how
academic careers changed over time, and of relations between English departments and secondary schools, to name just a few key areas.
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It would be unfair to demand all this and more of a first look at a complex
subject, yet sometimes such information would strengthen Graff's arguments. For instance, Graff points out that those who attacked theory in 1970s
and 80s used many of the same terms that the humanists of the 1920s used
against historical study of literature: pseudoscientific; against established
standards; stifling of creativity; impossible to handle in the classroom; pretentious. The recurrence of such complaints helps make Graff's point about
foregrounding conflict. But without context a reader can form some Inisleading impressions. The attack posed by theory in the 1970s and 80s came at a
particular time and place: when English Departments were beleaguered, enrollments dropped almost everywhere, new Ph.D.s couldn't get jobs, and
new pressures were coming from women, blacks, Latinos, and gays. Just at
this time a group of young leftish intellectuals started promoting a new kind
of reading, a whole new set of names (Foucault, Derrida, Barthes, Kristeva,
Iser, de Man, Lacan, etc.), a new set of key texts by Rousseau, Nietzsche,
Plato, Loyola, and Rilke, writers perhaps not unknown to English professors
but who were rarely the subject of faculty room conversation. Thousands of
English professors (at elite and not so elite colleges) saw a threat to their way
of doing things. At a time when departments were shrinking, the battle over
theory placed jobs and livelihoods at risk; careers were made or ruined. The
context is essential for understanding the whole story of the reaction to
theory. And one wonders if earlier conflicts would take on different dimensions and richer shadings if they too were presented in context. (Graff and
Michael Warner have helped provide such context themselves in their followup volume, The Origin of Literary Studies in America [New York, 1989), a
welcome book that reprints key statements from many of the major figures
mentioned in Professing Literature.)
One benefit from writing the first book on the subject is that one gets to set
the terms of the debate. Graff has written that book and we have every reason to be glad that he's so intelligent and judicious. We'll continue to discuss
his themes, and no doubt disagree with him over many of them. (One of the
disadvantages of going first!) Professing Literature is welcome as much for the
way it frames the issues as for how it engages them. What will follow will be
filling in, reshaping, contextualizing. Many scholars will certainly want to
add much more about the crucial battles between literature and composition,
theater, speech, linguistics, journalism, and other closely related fields. Others will test Graff's claim about resolving problems through adding faculty
by examining how changing course requirements for Ph.D.s and for majors
connected with hiring practices. And some will no doubt ask if lack of coherence within English is such a bad thing, and whether the problems English
faces have much connection with issues now being discussed within history,
psychology, philosophy, and a host of other human sciences. It is a tribute to
Graff's perception that we are left with such a rich lode of questions to explore. One hopes that this exceptional book will inaugurate a series of
equally interesting studies that explore the history and present state of the
discipline of English.
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